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Abstract
This paper develops an ordinal method of comparison of multidi-
mensional inequality. In our model, population distribution g is more
unequal than f when the distributions have common median and g
can be obtained from f by one or more shifts in population density
that increase inequality. For our benchmark 2x2 case (i.e. the case
of two binary outcome variables), we derive an empirical method for
making inequality comparisons. As an illustration, we apply the model
to childhood poverty in Mozambique.
JEL classification: D63, I32, O15
Keywords: Qualitative data, multidimensional first order dominance, multi-
dimensional inequality, ordinal comparison
1 Introduction
The primary aim of this paper is to contribute to the development of or-
dinal concepts of multidimensional inequality. We extend the Allison and
∗Correspondence: Lars Peter Østerdal, Department of Economics, University of Copen-
hagen, Studiestræde 6, DK-1455 Copenhagen K, Denmark.
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Foster (2004) framework for assessing inequality with one-dimensional cat-
egorical ordinal data (such as self-assessed health status). We assume that
well-being is measured in several dimensions (attributes) where outcomes
are categorical and can be ranked according to their desirability along each
dimension. There is no numerical scale with cardinal properties associated
with the categories. Only ordinal information about the desirability of out-
comes is available. Briefly, we say that population distribution f is more
unequal than population distribution g, if the distributions have common
median and f can be obtained from g by one or more shifts in population
density that all increase inequality.
We highlight our model is ordinal and diﬀers in this respect from existing
models of multidimensional inequality. Take the well-known concentration
index.1 It is a measure of two-dimensional inequality, and is a variant of the
Gini index. Data on well-being along one dimension (say income) is used to
rank individuals, so in this dimension only ordinal information is required.
At the same time, data on well-being along the second dimension (say in-
dividual health status) is measured on a cardinal scale. Gravel and Moyes
(2006) and Gravel, Moyes, and Tarroux (2008) develop another notion of
two-dimensional inequality where one of these is cardinally measurable. For
discussions of other (cardinal) multidimensional inequality measures, such
as the various multidimensional generalizations of the Gini index and the
Atkinson-Kolm-Sen approach, we refer to the surveys by Maasoumi (1999)
and Weymark (2006).
In Section 2 we motivate, illustrate and provide intuition, while Section
3 contains general definitions and a comparison of our approach with that of
Allison and Foster (2004). Section 4 addresses the empirically important 2x2
case (i.e., the case of two binary outcome variables), and we develop a proce-
dure for detecting inequality in practice. The test for inequality boils down
to comparisons of medians plus verification of a system of inequalities (the
exact system depending on the location of the median). The test requires
straightforward computations and can be carried out using a spreadsheet.
1See for example Wagstaﬀ et al. (1989, 1991) and Kakwani et al. (1997) for studies of
socioeconomic health inequality using this method.
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In Section 5 we show how our model can be applied to analyze deterioration
and dispersion in multidimensional deprivation. Micro data on childhood
poverty in Mozambique is used, and we rely on a bootstrapping method for
statistical analysis of sample data. Section 6 concludes and identifies future
research needs.
2 An ordinal approach to multidimensional inequal-
ity: illustration and intuition
Suppose a person’s well-being can be measured using two 0-1 binary vari-
ables, so there are four possible outcomes. Let (0, 0) denote the outcome
where both variables take the value 0, (1, 0) the outcome where the first
variable takes the value 1 and the second variable the value 0, and so on. In
the figure below arrows point to better adjacent outcomes.
(0, 0) → (1, 0)
↓ ↓
(0, 1) → (1, 1)
Outcome (0, 0) is the worst and (1, 1) is the best. We assume it is un-
known which of the two intermediate outcomes (0, 1) and (1, 0) is better. A
population is characterized by how people are distributed among the four
outcomes. This can be illustrated as follows:
f :
0 1
0 216
4
16
1 416
6
16
where 216 of the population has (0, 0),
4
16 has (0, 1) and (1, 0) respectively,
and 616 (1, 1). Call this distribution f , and compare with distribution g:
g :
0 1
0 416
2
16
1 216
8
16
3
Note that both f and g have a median value of 1 in each of the two
dimensions, and that g can be obtained from f by moving density of an
amount of 18 from outcome (0, 1) to outcome (0, 0) and by moving a similar
amount of density from (1, 0) to (1, 1). In other words, g can be obtained
from f by a correlation-increasing switch (Epstein and Tanny 1980, Boland
and Proschan 1988).2 Intuitively, g is obtained from f by a balanced move-
ment of density from the two intermediate outcomes to the two extremes.
It is reasonable to say that g is more unequal than f . The marginal distri-
butions are the same for both distributions, and if a person experiences a
bad outcome in one of the dimensions at g, the conditional probability that
the other outcome is also bad is higher for g than for f .
In practice, it is very unlikely to find two population distributions where
one can be obtained from the other by a correlation-increasing switch. This
would require that the diﬀerence in density between the two distributions
for the outcome (0, 0) is exactly equal to the corresponding diﬀerence for the
outcome (1, 1). Unless the populations (or number of observations) under-
lying the two distributions are extremely small this is only going to happen
in exceptional cases.
However, let us consider distribution h:
h :
0 1
0 416
2
16
1 316
7
16
where 416 of the population has (0, 0),
3
16 (1, 0),
2
16 (0, 1), and
7
16 (1, 1). Note
that f , g and h have the same median outcome (1, 1). Obviously, h cannot
be obtained from g or f by a correlation-increasing switch. Distribution h
can be obtained from g by moving population density amounting to 116 from
outcome (1, 1) to (1, 0). We regard the common two-dimensional median
as reference outcome,3 and say that h was obtained from g by a median-
2The notion of a correlation-increasing switch has been discussed by Atkinson and
Bourguignon (1982), Tsui (1999), Atkinson (2003), Bourguignon and Chakravarty (2003),
and others, in the context of multidimensional inequality and poverty measurement.
3The multidimensional median is the vector of coordinate-wise medians.
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preserving spread (Allison and Foster, 2004). Intuitively, h is more unequal
than g. It is obtained from g by moving density away from their common
median. Note that a median-preserving spread is a switch of density from
one outcome to another, which may or may not involve movement of den-
sity away from an intermediate outcome, depending on the location of the
median.
Accordingly, we will say that a distribution is ordinally more unequal
than another if it is possible to obtain the first distribution from the sec-
ond through a sequence of median-preserving spreads and/or correlation-
increasing switches. For instance, in our example, h is ordinally more un-
equal than f since there exists a distribution g, such that g can be obtained
from f through a correlation-increasing switch and h can be obtained from
g through a median-preserving spread.
In Section 3, we proceed to a formal definition of our ordinal inequality
concept in a general N attribute context. An obstacle in empirical imple-
mentation is that it is diﬃcult to check if a given distribution is more unequal
than another. Thus, in subsequent sections we focus on the empirically im-
portant 2x2 case.
3 General formulation
An outcome is a vector x = (x1, ..., xN ) described by N attributes, xj , j =
1, ..., N , where each attribute is defined on an attribute set Xj = {1, ..., nj}.
The set of outcomes to be considered is the product set X = X1× · · · ×XN
of the attribute sets Xj .
The statement x ≤ y will mean that xj ≤ yj for all j, and x < y will
mean that xj ≤ yj for all j and x 6= y.
A pseudo-distribution is a real-valued function f onX with
X
x∈X
f(x) = 1.
A pseudo-distribution f is a distribution if f(x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ X. Let fj
denote the marginal distribution on Xj .
Let mj (fj ) denote the median of fj on Xj . The (multidimensional)
median of f is the vector m(f) = (m1(f1), ...,mN (fN )), of N coordinate-
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wise medians.
We say that g can be derived from f by a bilateral transfer (of density), if
there are outcomes x, y such that g(z) = f(z) for z 6= x, y. It is diminishing
if y ≤ x and g(x) ≤ f(x). It is median-preserving if m(f) = m(g), and for
an outcome z it is z-directed if f(x) ≤ g(x) and x < y ≤ z or z ≤ y < x. It
is inequality-increasing if it is both median-preserving and median-directed.
Distribution g first order dominates distribution f if g can be derived
from f by a finite sequence of diminishing bilateral transfers, i.e., if there
are distributions f = f1, f2, ..., fk = g, where fi+1 is obtained from fi by a
diminishing bilateral transfer i = 1, ..., k − 1.4
For a pair of outcomes x, y let max(x, y) denote the outcome where the
ith attribute is max{xi, yi}, and let min(x, y) be the outcome where the ith
attribute is min{xi, yi}. Let f and g be two distributions for which there are
outcomes x, y, v, w such that g(z) = f(z) for z 6= x, y, v, w. We say that g is
derived from f by a correlation-increasing switch if we can choose x, y, v, w
such that v = min(x, y) and w = max(x, y), f(x) − g(x) = f(y) − g(y) >
0, f(v)− g(v) = f(w)− g(w) < 0.
If g can be derived from f by a finite sequence of median-preserving
inequality-increasing bilateral transfers and correlation-increasing switches,
we say that g is ordinally more unequal than f , or, as an equivalent state-
ment, f is ordinally more equal than g. Formally, g is ordinally more un-
equal than f if there are distributions f = f1, f2, ..., fk = g, where fi+1 is
obtained from fi by a correlation-increasing switch or a median-preserving
inequality-increasing bilateral transfer, i = 1, ..., k − 1.
Before proceeding, compare these definitions and concepts with the one-
dimensional case pursued by Allison and Foster (2004). For N = 1, X =
X1 = {1, ..., n1}, f = f1 and g = g1, define F (k) =
P
j=1,..,k f(j) and G in
a similar way. Allison and Foster (2004) say g has a greater spread than f
whenever m(g) = m(f) and G(k) ≥ F (k) for all k < m(f) and G(k) ≤ F (k)
for all k ≥ m(f). For N = 1, g has greater spread than f precisely if g
is more unequal than f (as defined here). Thus, the present model is a
4For general references on stochastic dominance, see, e.g., Shaked and Shanthikumar
(1994) or Müller and Stoyan (2002).
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generalization of Allison and Foster’s one-dimensional case.
Our ‘more unequal’ relation is based on the concept of median-preserving
inequality-increasing spreads. A central question is how to test if one dis-
tribution is ‘more unequal’ than another. For the one-dimensional case,
empirical implementation is straightforward: For two one-dimensional dis-
tributions f and g, testing that g is more unequal (i.e. has greater spread)
than f is a matter of checking whether n1 inequalities hold.5 For the multi-
dimensional case, empirical implementation is non-trivial. The next section
solves the 2x2 case.
4 The 2x2 case
In this section, we assume that an outcome is a vector x = (x1, x2) described
by two attributes, where each attribute xj is defined on an attribute setXj =
{0, 1}, j = 1, 2. Thus, the outcome set is the product set X = {0, 1}×{0, 1}.
For an outcome x = (x1, x2) we use the notation f(x1, x2) for f(x).
4.1 Finding first order dominance relations
Let f and g denote distributions on X. By a general result on multidimen-
sional first order dominance,6 we get that f first order dominates g if and
only if the following four inequalities are satisfied: g(0, 0) ≥ f(0, 0), g(0, 0)+
g(0, 1) ≥ f(0, 0) + f(0, 1), g(0, 0) + g(1, 0) ≥ f(0, 0) + f(1, 0), and g(0, 0) +
g(1, 0) + g(0, 1) ≥ f(0, 0) + f(1, 0) + f(0, 1).
Alternatively, we can define the function D(f, g) = min{g(0, 0)−f(0, 0),
g(0, 0)+g(0, 1)−f(0, 0)−f(0, 1), g(0, 0)+g(1, 0)−f(0, 0)−f(1, 0), g(0, 0)+
g(1, 0) + g(0, 1) − f(0, 0) − f(1, 0) − f(0, 1)}; then D(f, g) ≥ 0 if and only
if f first order dominated g. The function D is useful for testing statistical
significance of first order dominance relations.
5See Allison and Foster (2004) for a detailed discussion of how this test can be nicely
visualized.
6Cf. Lehmann (1955) and Theorem 1 in Kamae, Krenge and O’Brien (1977).
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4.2 Finding inequality relations
We proceed next to present necessary and suﬃcient conditions for f being
ordinally more equal than g.
Correlation-increasing switches are median-preserving, so a necessary
condition for the statement ‘f is more equal than g’ to be true is that the two
distributions have the same median.7 We can therefore rely on considering in
turn each of four possible cases of common median, and proceed as described
below.
Proposition 1 Let X = {0, 1}×{0, 1} and let f and g be two distributions
on X. Then g is more unequal than f if and only if one of the following
cases holds:
Case 1a: m(f) = m(g) = (1, 1), and g(0, 0) ≥ f(0, 0), g(0, 0) + g(0, 1) ≥
f(0, 0)+f(0, 1), g(0, 0)+g(1, 0) ≥ f(0, 0)+f(1, 0), g(0, 0)+g(1, 0)+g(0, 1) ≥
f(0, 0) + f(1, 0) + f(0, 1).
Case 1b: m(f) = m(g) = (1, 1), and f(1, 0) − g(1, 0) ≥ 0, f(0, 1) −
g(0, 1) ≥ 0, g(1, 1)− f(1, 1) ≤ min{f(1, 0)− g(1, 0), f(0, 1)− g(0, 1)}.
Case 2: m(f) = m(g) = (1, 0), and g(1, 0) ≤ f(1, 0), g(0, 1) ≤ f(0, 1),
g(1, 1) ≥ f(1, 1), g(0, 0) ≥ f(0, 0), f(0, 1)−g(0, 1) ≤ min{g(1, 1)−f(1, 1), g(0, 0)−
f(0, 0)}, f(1, 0)− g(1, 0) ≥ f(0, 1)− g(0, 1).
Case 3: m(f) = m(g) = (0, 1), and g(0, 1) ≤ f(0, 1), g(1, 0) ≤ f(1, 0),
g(1, 1) ≥ f(1, 1), g(0, 0) ≥ f(0, 0), f(1, 0)−g(1, 0) ≤ min{g(1, 1)−f(1, 1), g(0, 0)−
f(0, 0)}, f(0, 1)− g(0, 1) ≥ f(1, 0)− g(1, 0).
Case 4a: m(f) = m(g) = (0, 0), and f(0, 0) ≥ g(0, 0), f(0, 0) + f(0, 1) ≥
g(0, 0)+g(0, 1), f(0, 0)+f(1, 0) ≥ g(0, 0)+g(1, 0), f(0, 0)+f(1, 0)+f(0, 1) ≥
g(0, 0) + g(1, 0) + g(0, 1).
Case 4b: m(f) = m(g) = (0, 0), and f(1, 0) − g(1, 0) ≥ 0, f(0, 1) −
g(0, 1) ≥ 0, g(0, 0)− f(0, 0) ≤ min{f(1, 0)− g(1, 0), f(0, 1)− g(0, 1)}.
7Suppose that g is derived from f by some correlation-increasing switch. The
correlation-increasing switch is non-trivial if f 6= g. For the case X = {0, 1} × {0, 1},
any non-trivial correlation-increasing switch can be conducted by means of two bilateral
transfers (of the same amount of mass) from (0, 1) and (1, 0) to the extreme outcomes
(0, 0) and (1, 1).
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The proof of Proposition 1 is given in Appendix A. Note that the in-
equalities in Case 1a mean that f first order dominates g, and those in 4a
that g first order dominates f . The intuitive meaning and the derivation of
the inequalities in the other cases are discussed in the Appendix.
5 Empirical illustration
In Mozambique as in most other developing countries, rising incomes and
investment in schooling, health, and sanitation have increased the level of
human capital and indices of human development. While this development
has impacted on living-standards of both adults and children, its impact
on children is of particular interest. The acquisition of human capital in
early childhood is imperative for future learning, earnings and health sta-
tus (UNICEF 2006). Moreover, large gaps persist between rich and poor,
between rural and urban areas and between boys and girls. This tends to
widen the variation in acquisition of human capital, productivity and liv-
ing standards as summarized in surveys by Strauss and Thomas (1995) and
Orazem and King (2007).
To address the above challenges some governments have initiated voucher
or cash transfer programmes targeted at disadvantaged children.8 A gen-
eral problem with such government transfer programmes is to make sure
that transfers are directed at the most disadvantaged children. Judging
by observable characteristics, such as gender or household characteristics,
some children may not appear to be disadvantaged (to the administrator)
while in fact they are. These children are particularly vulnerable. Their
group characteristics hide their true state, and the opposite may also be
true. Avoiding ineﬃcient loss of resources in transfer programmes, requires
that governments can recognize people with high dispersion in well-being
indicators and have at their disposal a set of analytical tools to help guide
such allocations. Our theoretical framework is such a tool and in this sec-
8The most famous of these initiatives is probably Mexico’s PRO-
GRESA/Oportunidades programme, which aims at increasing children’s school at-
tendance among poor families, by awarding grants to mothers conditional on school
enrolment. See Parker, Rubalcava and Teruel (2007) for further discussion and examples.
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tion we illustrate how it can be applied in examining the living-standards of
Mozambican children.
To measure living standard we use a set of seven UNICEF well-being in-
dicators, the so-called Bristol Indicators, including severe childhood depriva-
tions related to nutrition, water, sanitation, health care, shelter, education
and information. Appendix B lists underlying definitions. To illustrate
our 2x2 ordinal inequality concept we combine these seven indicators into
two-dimensional measures. Such combinations are arbitrary so we chose,
initially, to form all possible combinations — 19 in all. Some indicators ex-
clude others. The nutrition and health indicators are only for pre-school
children. This excludes associations with the education and information
indicators. Among the 19 possible combinations, we focus in what follows
on three combinations which illustrate well the key characteristics of our
theoretical approach.9
Several household- and child characteristics have in the past been used to
target government transfer programmes to poor and disadvantaged groups
of households in developing countries. Here, we include three such char-
acteristics, rural-urban area of residence, gender of head of household, and
gender of the child.10 This results in a total of eight categories of children,
which will be compared with each other. If any of these groups has lower
standards of living or is more vulnerable than others, then characteristics
of that group should be considered as a particularly important criterion for
targeting government transfers.
9Results for the remaining pair-wise comparisons are available from the authors upon
request.
10Urban-rural area of residence is likely to have a significant impact on living standards
mainly due to the low population density of rural areas, which makes supply of high
quality public services more costly. Children living in female headed households are more
likely than other children to fall below the poverty line primarily because woman’s wages
and education tend to be lower than men’s . Buvini´c and Gupta (1997) review literature
relating female headship and poverty. However, as Handa (1996) observes, female headed
households are also likely to spend a larger share of their income on improving children’s
human capital. Finally, households may discriminate based on gender of the child. For
example in Mozambique, it is not uncommon for especially rural families to invest more
in the education of boys as compared to girls (UNICEF, 2006).
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5.1 Data
Data for our empirical analysis was obtained from the Mozambican De-
mographics and Health Survey (DHS 2003).11 Data was collected by the
National Institute of Statistics (INE) and the Ministry of Health (MISAU),
and the survey sample is representative at national and provincial level and
by area of residence (urban/rural). The purpose of the survey was to pro-
vide information on health and nutrition, in particular on fertility and on
maternal- and child health. Focus was on women and children welfare and
respondents were all females between 15 and 49 in the household. Data
includes information such as vaccinations, childhood illness (diarrhoea and
respiratory infections), nutritional status of children, access to water, sani-
tation facilities, housing, possessions, education and school attendance, em-
ployment, and wealth quintiles.
The survey was sampled based on results of the 2002/3 Mozambican
National Household Survey (IAF 2002/3), and the sample strategy resulted
in a stratified random sample collected in three stages. In the first stage,
Primary Sampling Units (UPA’s) or clusters were selected. This was fol-
lowed by the identification of the Areas of Enumeration (AE) in each UPA,
and in the third stage a total of 24 households in each AE were interviewed.
All households were asked to answer the questionnaire on household char-
acteristics and in households with young children (less than five years old)
additional health data was collected on immunization coverage, vitamin A
supplementation, treatment of childhood diseases, and recent occurrences
of diarrhoea, fever, or coughing. Overall, 56 UPAs and an equal number of
AEs were included in each province except in the provinces of Nampula and
Zambezia.12 Data collection began in August 2003 and ended in December
2003.
Among the 12,315 households selected for interview 13,657 women were
11Lindelow (2006) studies socioeconomic health inequalities in Mozambique using the
concentration index. His study is based on income and health data from the 1996-1997
household survey.
12Due to the population weight of these two provinces, 68 UPAs and AEs were included.
Survey weights are supplied with the data.
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identified for interview and of these 12,418 were actually interviewed giving
a response rate of 91 percent. Information is available for 33,058 children of
less than 18 years of age. The exact number of observations for each individ-
ual deprivation indicator is given in Table 1, averages are listed in UNICEF
(2006), and here we will now investigate two-dimensional combinations.
5.2 Results
Table 1 presents results for the three selected attribute combinations and
the eight categories of children referred to above (weighted by survey sample
weights). The top panel shows the proportions of children in each category
with access to adequate sanitation in combination with vaccine or diarrhoea
treatment, while the middle panel shows access to adequate sanitation and
adequate housing, and the bottom panel access to adequate sanitation and
school attendance. Accordingly, the first row of Table 1 shows the propor-
tion of girls in male headed rural households with access to sanitation and
adequate health treatment. Note that 18.8 percent of these children had no
access to sanitation in combination with no health treatment. Some 44.4
percent did not have access to sanitation but did receive health treatment,
while only 4.8 percent had access to good sanitary conditions but did not re-
ceive adequate health treatment. Finally 32 percent of this group of children
had access to both sanitation and health treatment.
12
Area, 
Sex of head of household, 
Sex of child
(0,0) (0,1) (1,0) (1,1) # of obs.
Rural, Male, Girl 18.8 44.4 4.8 32.0 2262
Rural, Male, Boy 19.2 44.8 4.7 31.3 2288
Rural, Female, Girl 13.9 47.9 4.7 33.6 580
Rural, Female, Boy 15.7 44.9 3.7 35.6 598
Urban, Male, Girl 2.6 18.8 7.6 71.0 1215
Urban, Male, Boy 2.9 18.2 8.1 70.9 1156
Urban, Female, Girl 2.0 19.5 3.2 75.3 382
Urban, Female, Boy 3.7 16.7 8.5 71.1 341
Total 13.9 37.6 5.4 43.1 8822
Rural, Male, Girl 58.9 3.5 31.6 6.0 7437
Rural, Male, Boy 56.9 3.5 33.3 6.3 7682
Rural, Female, Girl 54.1 5.3 29.9 10.7 2212
Rural, Female, Boy 55.6 5.1 26.3 13.0 2356
Urban, Male, Girl 13.4 4.3 26.4 55.9 4986
Urban, Male, Boy 13.6 5.3 25.2 55.9 4933
Urban, Female, Girl 13.5 4.5 20.3 61.6 1812
Urban, Female, Boy 13.4 4.8 23.2 58.6 1640
Total 43.0 4.2 29.3 23.5 33058
Rural, Male, Girl 27.7 34.5 10.3 27.6 3716
Rural, Male, Boy 16.3 41.3 9.4 33.0 4010
Rural, Female, Girl 21.6 38.4 8.7 31.2 1223
Rural, Female, Boy 19.2 41.0 8.1 31.7 1348
Urban, Male, Girl 6.0 9.9 7.2 76.9 2858
Urban, Male, Boy 5.0 13.1 5.3 76.6 2912
Urban, Female, Girl 8.2 9.0 5.3 77.5 1140
Urban, Female, Boy 7.2 11.2 4.2 77.4 1025
Total 16.0 28.8 8.2 47.0 18232
Note: The first element, i , in vector (i,j ) indicate sanitation deprivation. The second 
element, j , indicate health deprivation (in the top panel), shelter deprivation (in the 
middle panel), and education deprivation (in the lower panel). i,j  = 0 is deprivation, i,j 
= 1 is no deprivation.
Source: Authors' calculations from DHS 2003.
(Sanitation deprivation, Shelter deprivation)
(Sanitation deprivation, Health deprivation)
(Sanitation deprivation, Education deprivation)
Table 1: Percentages of children’s two-dimensional living standards.
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Turning to first order dominance and ordinal inequality relations, the
three matrices in Table 2 present our results calculated from Table 1. The
numbers 1 and 0 represent the presence of first order dominance and no first
order dominance, respectively, while the capital letters A, B, C, and D refer
to four types of ordinal inequality relations (explained below). Numbers
and letters are organized so the entry 1 indices that the row group first
order dominates the column group. We test a null-hypothesis of equality
of the two distributions using a bootstrap procedure.13 In the case of first
order dominance, the test statistic is the minimum function D in section 4.1.
Following common convention, the null-distribution is generated by merging
the observations from the two groups. From the null-distribution, two new
samples are generated (drawing randomly with replacement) corresponding
in size to the original two samples, and the test statistic D is calculated.
Repeating this procedure 1000 times, we obtain a distribution over the test
statistic consistent with the null-hypothesis - which can then be compared
with the test statistic for the original sample. Asterisks in Table 2 indicate
significance at the five percent level, meaning that the observed value of D is
larger than the 95th percentile of its bootstrapped distribution (indicating
that the two groups are genuinely distinct).14
13We refer to Efron and Tibshirani (1993, ch. 16) for a general discussion of the boot-
strap approach to hypothesis testing.
14Robertson, Wright and Dykstra (1988) and Bhattacharya and Dykstra (1994) develop
a test for equality of distributions against an alternative of first order dominance. We
do not discuss this approach here. For continuous-variable models, methods for testing
multidimensional first- and higher order dominance have been developed by Crawford
(2005), Duclos et al. (2006), McCaig and Yatchew (2007) and Anderson (2008).
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Area, 
Sex of head of household, 
Sex of child Median
Rural, 
Male, 
Girl
Rural, 
Male, 
Boy
Rural, 
Female, 
Girl
Rural, 
Female, 
Boy
Urban, 
Male, 
Girl
Urban, 
Male, 
Boy
Urban, 
Female, 
Girl
Urban, 
Female, 
Boy
Rural, Male, Girl (0,1) 1D 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rural, Male, Boy (0,1) 0 1D 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rural, Female, Girl (0,1) 1 1* 1D 0D* 0 0 0 0
Rural, Female, Boy (0,1) 1* 1* 0 1D 0 0 0 0
Urban, Male, Girl (1,1) 1* 1* 1* 1* 1A 0 0 0
Urban, Male, Boy (1,1) 1* 1* 1* 1* 0 1A 0 0
Urban, Female, Girl (1,1) 1* 1* 1* 1* 0 0 1A 0
Urban, Female, Boy (1,1) 1* 1* 1* 1* 0 0 0 1A
Area, 
Sex of head of household, 
Sex of child Median
Rural, 
Male, 
Girl
Rural, 
Male, 
Boy
Rural, 
Female, 
Girl
Rural, 
Female, 
Boy
Urban, 
Male, 
Girl
Urban, 
Male, 
Boy
Urban, 
Female, 
Girl
Urban, 
Female, 
Boy
Rural, Male, Girl (0,0) 1B 0B 0B* 0B* 0 0 0 0
Rural, Male, Boy (0,0) 1 1B 0B* 0 0 0 0 0
Rural, Female, Girl (0,0) 1* 1* 1B 0 0 0 0 0
Rural, Female, Boy (0,0) 1* 0 0 1B 0 0 0 0
Urban, Male, Girl (1,1) 1* 1* 1* 1* 1A 0 0 0
Urban, Male, Boy (1,1) 1* 1* 1* 1* 0 1A 0 0
Urban, Female, Girl (1,1) 1* 1* 1* 1* 0 1A 1A 0
Urban, Female, Boy (1,1) 1* 1* 1* 1* 0 1A 0 1A
Area, 
Sex of head of household, 
Sex of child Median
Rural, 
Male, 
Girl
Rural, 
Male, 
Boy
Rural, 
Female, 
Girl
Rural, 
Female, 
Boy
Urban, 
Male, 
Girl
Urban, 
Male, 
Boy
Urban, 
Female, 
Girl
Urban, 
Female, 
Boy
Rural, Male, Girl (0,1) 1D 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rural, Male, Boy (0,1) 1* 1D 1* 1* 0 0 0 0
Rural, Female, Girl (0,1) 1* 0 1D 0 0 0 0 0
Rural, Female, Boy (0,1) 1* 0 0 1D 0 0 0 0
Urban, Male, Girl (1,1) 1* 1* 1* 1* 1A 0 0C* 0
Urban, Male, Boy (1,1) 1* 1* 1* 1* 0 1A 0 0C*
Urban, Female, Girl (1,1) 1* 1* 1* 1* 0 0 1A 0
Urban, Female, Boy (1,1) 1* 1* 1* 1* 0 0 0 1A
Source: Authors' calculations from DHS 2003.
(Sanitation deprivation, Health deprivation)
(Sanitation deprivation, Shelter deprivation)
(Sanitation deprivation, Education deprivation)
Note: 1 indicate first order dominance, 0 no first order dominance. A and B indicate ordinal equality when the median is extreme, 
in (1,1) and (0,0) respectively, and there is first order dominance. C is ordinal equality, also, when the median is extreme but, 
when there is no first order dominance. D indicate ordinal equality when the median is non-extreme, (0,1) or (1,0).  Test of 
significance was conducted for first order dominances and ordinal equality of the diagonal, using the permutation bootstrap 
method. * indicate a significant test statistic at the 5% level.
Table 2: First order dominance and ordinal inequality relations among
groups of children.
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5.2.1 Evidence of first order dominance relations
Making first order dominance comparisons in Table 2 from the two-dimensional
distributions of Table 1 involve the four inequalities of Section 4.1. In the
case of ordinal inequality (without the presence of first order dominance)
the bootstrapped test statistic is the minimum function over the set of in-
equalities as specified in Proposition 1 for each relevant case.
To illustrate, compare the distribution of access to adequate sanitation
and adequate shelter of girls in rural female headed households to that of
girls in rural male headed households, and say we wish to determine whether
the former first order dominates the latter. From the four inequalities of
Section 4.1 and the distributions of the middle panel of Table 1 we need to
evaluate if 58.9 ≥ 54.1, 58.9+3.5 ≥ 54.1+5.3, 58.9+31.6 ≥ 54.1+29.9, and
58.9 + 3.5 + 31.6 ≥ 54.1 + 5.3 + 29.9. All inequalities are fulfilled, so girls
in rural female headed households are better-oﬀ than girls in male headed
households. First order dominance exists, indicated by a 1 in the third row -
first column of the middle panel of Table 2. Using the permutation bootstrap
this dominance is also significant at the five percent level, indicated with an
asterisk.
Table 3 summarizes all 19 first order dominance tables matching all pos-
sible combinations of the eight categories of children. Note that matching
two groups of children, with distributions f and g, there are three possible
outcomes: g first order dominates f (i.e. g wins), neither g nor f dom-
inates (i.e. a draw), or f dominates g (i.e. g looses). Overall, Table 3
shows that urban households dominate rural households with children, par-
ticularly girls, of urban male headed households being better-oﬀ than other
children. Rural areas generally show the opposite pattern. Female headed
households dominate male headed households with boys being better-oﬀ
than girls. Studying in more detail the 19 matrices, it becomes clear that
girls of rural male headed households loose because they have poor living
standards in four (sets of) well-being indicators: access to safe water, ade-
quate sanitation, suﬃcient shelter and education. The pattern is less clear
for dominance of girls in urban male headed households, but combinations
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of three indicators (access to safe water, access to information, and better
anthropometrics) seem important. A government transfer programme fo-
cussing on children who are most severely deprived should therefore target
male headed households in rural areas, particularly if the share of girls is
large in these households.
Area, 
Sex of head of household, 
Sex of child
Rural, 
Male, 
Girl
Rural, 
Male, 
Boy
Rural, 
Female, 
Girl
Rural, 
Female, 
Boy
Urban, 
Male, 
Girl
Urban, 
Male, 
Boy
Urban, 
Female, 
Girl
Urban, 
Female, 
Boy
Number 
of won 
matches
Rural, Male, Girl 19 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 23
Rural, Male, Boy 6 19 3 4 0 0 0 0 32
Rural, Female, Girl 13 8 19 1 0 0 0 0 41
Rural, Female, Boy 9 4 6 19 0 0 0 0 38
Urban, Male, Girl 19 19 19 19 19 5 6 8 114
Urban, Male, Boy 19 19 19 19 2 19 3 8 108
Urban, Female, Girl 13 13 19 19 2 5 19 1 91
Urban, Female, Boy 14 14 19 18 0 1 1 19 86
Number of lost matches 112 100 104 99 23 30 29 36
Source: Authors' calculations from DHS 2003.
Table 3: Number of first order dominance relations.
5.2.2 Evidence of inequality relations
Ordinal inequality relations compare within-group inequality between groups;
that is, if well-being is more unequally distributed in one group than in an-
other. The ordinal inequality relation is particularly useful in determining
which of two incomparable groups (from a first order dominance point of
view) is more vulnerable.
The following four examples illustrate how ordinal inequality relations
can be used to rank groups of children by their within group dispersion of
well-being.
A test of ordinal inequality requires examination of the median and sub-
sequently of a set of case dependent inequalities. From Proposition 1, four
basic situations imply that f is more equal than g: (A) the median is ex-
treme in (1,1) and f first order dominates g, directly implies that f is more
equal than g from Case 1a of Proposition 1. (B) the median is extreme in
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(0,0) and g first order dominates f , implies that f is more equal than g from
Case 4a. (C) the median is extreme and we have a first order dominance
draw (neither f nor g first order dominates), implies that equality i deter-
mined by the three inequalities in Case 1b or 4b. Finally (D) the median
is non-extreme implies that equality is determined by the five inequalities
in Case 2 or 3. Table 4 illustrates the four types of equality (A to D), by
pairwise comparing eight selected groups of children from Table 1.
UFB 0 1 UMB 0 1
0 13.4 4.8 0 13.6 5.3
1 23.2 58.6 1 25.2 55.9
RMG 0 1 RFG 0 1
0 58.9 3.5 0 54.1 5.3
1 31.6 6 1 29.9 10.7
UMB 0 1 UFB 0 1
0 5 13.1 0 7.2 11.2
1 5.3 76.6 1 4.2 77.4
RFG 0 1 RFB 0 1
0 13.9 47.9 0 15.7 44.9
1 4.7 33.6 1 3.7 35.6
A:
B:
C:
D:
Table 4: Pairwise comparisons illustrated (figures extracted from Table 2).
Type A, where the shared median is (1, 1) is simple. To see this, note
in Table 4A (which compares sanitation and shelter deprivation of urban
boys in female headed households (UFB) to that in male headed house-
holds (UMB) that the distribution for male headed households can be ob-
tained from that of female headed households by moving density away from
the shared median backwards in the distribution to worse outcomes. To
be exact, make use of three median-preserving spreads by transferring, re-
spectively, 0.5, 2.0, and 0.2 from (1, 1) to (0, 1), (1, 0), and (0, 0). That
is, well-being of urban boys in female headed households is concentrated
more densely around the median as compared to that in male headed house-
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holds. Consequently the distribution in female headed households is also
more equal.
Type B, also from the middle panel of Table 1, is illustrated in Table
4B. It compares rural girls in female headed households (RFG) to rural
girls in male headed households (RMG). Here, the distribution for female
headed households can be obtained from that of male headed households
by moving 1.8 mass from (0, 0) to (0, 1), 3.0 from (0, 0) to (1, 1) and 1.7
from (1, 0) to (1, 1) . Thus, while female headed households dominate male
headed households, male headed households are more equal for this group
of children.
Type C, in Table 4C also relates to groups with extreme medians, but
none of the groups dominate in this case. This situation occurs in the dis-
tribution of sanitation and education deprivation of urban boys in male
headed households (UMB) matched against urban boys in female headed
households (UFB) in the bottom panel of Table 1 and 2. To determine
an ordinal more equal relation we evaluate three inequalities: 13.1 ≥ 11.2,
5.3 ≥ 4.2, and 77.4− 76.6 ≤ min{13.1− 11.2, 5.3− 4.2}. It follows that well-
being of boys in male headed households is more equally distributed than
well-being of boys in female headed households.15 To see this, start with a
correlation-increasing transfer of 1.1, then do a median-preserving spread of
0.3 and 0.8 from (1, 1) and (0, 1), respectively, to (0, 0). Measured by the
two indicators (sanitation and education deprivation), it is not possible to
determine whether urban boys in male headed or female headed households
are better-oﬀ (i.e. whether one group first order dominates the other). How-
ever, boys in female headed households are more vulnerable since they are
more unequally distributed.
Type D, in Table 4D illustrates a non-extreme median from the top panel
of Table 1 and 2. It requires evaluation of the five inequalities in Section
4.2, Case 2. To see this, compare girls of rural female headed households
(RFG) to boys of these households (RFB). The five inequalities that need
15Because the shared median is in (1,1) the left hand side of the last inequality refers
to proportions in (1,1). Had the median been in (0,0) the left hand side would also have
referred to proportions in that outcome.
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to be evaluated for this match are: 44.9 ≤ 47.9, 3.7 ≤ 4.7, 35.6 ≥ 33.6,
15.7 ≥ 13.9, and 4.7−3.7 ≤ min{35.6−33.6, 15.7−13.9}. Hence, well-being
of girls is more equally distributed than that of boys.16 Again, to show this
use a correlation increasing transfer of 0.9 from (0, 1) and (1, 0) to (1, 1) and
(0, 0), followed by a median-preserving spread of 0.9 and 1.1 from (0, 1) to
(0, 0) and (1, 1), respectively.17
The well-being distribution of boys is illuminating. Boys with very good
access to household sanitation and medical treatment hide the fact that
within this group, some boys lack access to these basic necessities, making
the group appear equally well-oﬀ to that of girls. Based on estimates of first
order dominance, decision makers are therefore equally likely to transfer
resources to the two groups, while in fact they may wish to focus more on
providing better living-standards for the more vulnerable group of boys than
for the group of girls.
Table 5 summarizes results from all the 19 tests of ordinal inequality. We
note that one group has well-being more equally distributed than a compara-
tor group if they share the same median and one of the four situations just
described is fulfilled. In Table 5 this corresponds to the number of times row
f is more equal than column g. So urban households are in general more
equally distributed than rural households; male headed households tend to
be more equally distributed than female headed households; and boys to be
more equal than girls.
16The left hand side of the last inequality refers to proportions in (1,0) as the shared
median is in (0,1). Had the median been in (1,0) the left hand side would have referred
to proportions in (0,1).
17Due to rounding errors, it is not possible to create precisely one distribution from the
other.
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Area, 
Sex of head of household, 
Sex of child
Rural, 
Male, 
Girl
Rural, 
Male, 
Boy
Rural, 
Female, 
Girl
Rural, 
Female, 
Boy
Urban, 
Male, 
Girl
Urban, 
Male, 
Boy
Urban, 
Female, 
Girl
Urban, 
Female, 
Boy Total
Rural, Male, Girl 19 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 28
Rural, Male, Boy 1 19 2 1 0 0 0 0 23
Rural, Female, Girl 1 1 19 5 0 0 0 0 26
Rural, Female, Boy 0 0 0 19 0 0 0 0 19
Urban, Male, Girl 4 4 1 1 19 5 7 8 49
Urban, Male, Boy 4 4 1 1 2 19 3 9 43
Urban, Female, Girl 1 1 1 1 2 5 19 1 31
Urban, Female, Boy 2 2 1 1 0 1 1 19 27
Total 32 34 28 32 23 30 30 37
Source: Authors' calculations from DHS 2003.
Table 5: Number of ordinal inequality relations
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have developed an ordinal concept of multi-dimensional
inequality, building on Allison and Foster’s (2004) framework for comparing
inequalities with one-dimensional categorical data. To illustrate how our
model can be applied in the 2x2 case we used DHS data from Mozambique.
Such DHS data are available for a large number of countries across the
developing world.
It emerged that urban households are better-oﬀ than rural households
from a first order dominance point of view. This is hardly surprising. How-
ever, it also emerged that rural female headed households are better-oﬀ than
rural male headed households; and girls in urban male headed households
are best oﬀ, while girls in rural male headed households are worse oﬀ (Table
3). These findings deserve attention in policy debates.
We note that the exotic ordinal inequality relations (Type C and D) did
not appear frequently in the present sample and for the chosen indicators.
Whether this is because these types of inequality relations are indeed rare
empirically cannot be established with the data at hand. While the DHS
data are widely available across a large number of countries our results high-
light that the standard DHS does not produce obvious binary measures of
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well-being. For example, it would have been revealing to be able to com-
pare nutrition and education of children. However, nutrition (antropomet-
ric) variables are only available for non-school children and woman of 15-49
years of age. This suggests that a revision of DHS data collection eﬀorts
would be desirable.
Following common convention, we focussed on tests of equality of the two
distributions. An alternative null-hypothesis discussed by Dardanoni and
Forcina (1999) in the context of one-dimensional dominance of first- and
higher order is non-dominance (including exact equality of distributions).
That means that dominance is rejected unless there is strong evidence in
favor of it. A similar statement applies to a test for inequality. In order to
perform such a test in a multidimensional framework, the analyst would have
to determine a ‘least favorable case’; that is, a null-distribution consistent
with the null-hypothesis that makes the observed distributions as plausible
as possible. We conjecture that the ‘least favorable case’ in this situation
is, in fact, a case of equal distributions, and that it is valid to interpret our
bootstrapping procedure along this line of reasoning.
In sum, we believe to have shown that it is possible to develop a mean-
ingful and intuitive concept of ordinal multidimensional inequality. We have
also demonstrated how it can be applied in the 2x2 case. Future research
will be required to explore how to deal with more general cases.
A Appendix: Proof of Proposition 1
We will make use of the following lemma.
Lemma A Suppose that m(f) = m(g) and g is obtained from f by a
sequence of m(f)-directed bilateral transfers. Then each of these bilateral
transfers is inequality-increasing.
Proof of Lemma A: Define the sets L(m(f)) = {x ∈ X|x ≤ m(f)} and
U(m(f)) = {x ∈ X|m(f) ≤ x}. Then g is obtained from f by a sequence of
bilateral transfers of the following four kinds: from m(f) to outcomes in the
sets L(m(f))\{m(f)} and U(m(f))\{m(f)} respectively, andm(f)-directed
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bilateral transfers within the sets L(m(f))\{m(f)} and U(m(f))\{m(f)}
respectively.
Consider an ordering of the bilateral transfers, where the bilateral trans-
fers are numbered 1, 2, ... etc., such that we first have the m(f)-directed
bilateral transfer within L(m(f))\{m(f)}, second the m(f)-directed bilat-
eral transfers within U(m(f))\{m(f)}, third the m(f)-directed bilateral
transfers from m(f) to outcomes in L(m(f))\{m(f)} and fourth the m(f)-
directed bilateral transfers from m(f) to U(m(f))\{m(f)}.
Suppose that the bilateral transfers 1, 2, ..., h− 1 are median-preserving,
but bilateral transfer h fails to be median-preserving. Let m denote the new
median following bilateral transfer h. It is clear that the median-directed
bilateral transfers of the first two types in the ordering (that is, the median-
directed bilateral transfers within L(m(f))\{m(f)} and the median-directed
bilateral transfers within U(m(f))\{m(f)}) are median-preserving, hence we
consider the case where bilateral transfer h is either fromm(f) to an outcome
in L(m(f))\{m(f)} or from m(f) to an outcome in U(m(f))\{m(f)}.
If bilateral transfer h is from m(f) to an outcome in L(m(f))\{m(f)},
we must have m < m(f). Hence, for the median em resulting after the
last bilateral transfer from m(f) to outcomes in L(m(f))\{m(f)} we also
have em < m(f). This implies that the last bilateral transfers from m(f) to
U(m(f))\{m(f)} will not further change the median relative to em, contra-
dicting m(f) = m(g).
If bilateral transfer h is from m(f) to an outcome in U(m(f))\{m(f)},
for the new medianm we havem(f) <m. Hence, for the median em resulting
after the last bilateral transfer from m(f) to outcomes in U(m(f))\{m(f)}
we also have m(f) < em, contradicting m(f) = m(g). ¤
We are now ready to prove Proposition 1. Case 3 is similar to Case 2,
and Case 4 is similar to Case 1. Thus, we focus below on Cases 1 and 2.
Case 1: m(f) = m(g) = (1, 1).
Suppose that f first order dominates g. That is, it is possible to go from
f to g by a finite sequence of diminishing bilateral transfers. By Lemma A,
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each such bilateral transfer is median-preserving and inequality-increasing.
Thus, g is more unequal than f .
Suppose that f does not first order dominate g, and g does not first-order
dominate f . Then, it is impossible to go from f to g (or vice versa) without
making use of at least one correlation-increasing switch. This implies that,
if g is more unequal than f , f(1, 0) − g(1, 0) > 0 and f(0, 1) − g(0, 1) > 0,
since if either f(1, 0)−g(1, 0) ≤ 0 or f(1, 0)−g(1, 0) ≤ 0 it would be possible
to go from f to g without any correlation-increasing switches. On the other
hand, these two conditions are not suﬃcient (for g being more unequal than
f). Roughly speaking, we need a condition ensuring that all density that
is going to be transferred to (1, 1) can be transferred from (0, 1) or (1, 0) in
connection with a correlation-increasing switch.
Now, we claim that if g is more unequal than f (and g is not first order
dominated by f) then it is possible to obtain g from f from a sequence (of
correlation-increasing switches and median-directed bilateral transfers) that
involves only a single correlation-increasing transfer and no transfers from
the outcome (1, 1) to other outcomes.
We first prove the latter, i.e. we prove that no transfers from (1, 1) to
other outcomes are required. For this, consider a given sequence (leading
from f to g) that contains a transfer of the amount β from (1, 1) to another
outcome z. Assume, without loss of generality that z = (0, 1). (If z = (0, 0)
then split the bilateral transfer up into two nested bilateral transfers, one
from (1, 1) to (0, 1) and one from (0, 1) to (0, 0); the case z = (1, 0) is
symmetric to the one treated here and hence can be omitted).
As noted earlier, we know that the sequence contains at least one correlation-
increasing switch (since if otherwise f would first order dominate g). Now,
pick an arbitrary correlation-increasing switch from the sequence, and let
α denote the amount of density moved from each of the outcomes (0, 1)
and (1, 0) (to (0, 0) and (1, 1) respectively). We can then decompose this
correlation-increasing switch into two bilateral transfers: a bilateral transfer
of the amount α from (0, 1) to (1, 1) and a bilateral transfer of the amount
α from (1, 0) to (0, 0). We consider two cases: (a) α ≥ β, and (b) α < β.
(a) Replace the bilateral transfer from (1, 1) to (0, 1) of the amount β
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with a bilateral transfer of the amount β from (1, 0) to (0, 0), and reduce
the amount of density transferred between each pair of outcomes from α to
α−β. Note that the amount of density eventually allocated to each outcome
remains the same.
(b) Replace the correlation-increasing switch (which moves the amount
α between each pair of outcomes) with a bilateral transfer of the amount α
from (1, 0) to (0, 0), and reduce the size of the bilateral transfer from (1, 1) to
(0, 1) to β−α. Again, note that the amount of density eventually allocated
to each outcome remains the same.
Proceeding in this way until no transfers from (1, 1) to other outcomes re-
main, we can eliminate all transfers from (1, 1) to other outcomes. Note that
we have not shown (and it is not needed for our argument) that after each
elimination of some bilateral transfer from (1, 1) to another outcome, the
resulting sequence of pseudo-distributions consists entirely of distributions.
It is suﬃcient to observe that when all bilateral transfers from (1, 1) to other
outcomes have been eliminated, what remains is a sequence of correlation-
increasing transfers and/or bilateral transfers from (0, 1) to (0, 0) and from
(1, 0) to (0, 0). For this sequence, it is clear that each intermediate pseudo-
distribution is a distribution. In particular, the operations (i.e. correlation-
increasing transfers and/or bilateral transfers from (0, 1) to (0, 0) and from
(1, 0) to (0, 0)) can be arranged in an arbitrary order and we can obtain g
from f at single operation of each the three types.
From these observations we get the following: Suppose that f does not
first order dominate g. Then g is more unequal than f if and only if the
following 3 inequalities are satisfied: f(1, 0)−g(1, 0) ≥ 0, f(0, 1)−g(0, 1) ≥ 0
and g(1, 1)− f(1, 1) ≤ min{f(1, 0)− g(1, 0), f(0, 1)− g(0, 1)}.
Note that in conjunction with the assumption that f does not first order
dominate g, the 3 inequalities imply that g(0, 0) − f(0, 0) > 0. From this
observation it follows that the 3 inequalities are both necessary and suﬃ-
cient: The three inequalities are necessary, since if one of them were violated,
clearly we could not get g from f by a single correlation-increasing transfer
and/or bilateral transfers from (0, 1) and (1, 0) to (0, 0). To verify that the
conditions are suﬃcient, we give the following constructive argument: Sup-
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pose that the conditions are satisfied. Let α = g(1, 1)−f(1, 1). Let bf be the
distribution obtained from a correlation-increasing transfer of the amount α
(where α is transferred from (0, 1) to (0, 0) and α is transferred from (1, 0)
to (1, 1)). Thus, bf(1, 1) = g(1, 1), bf(0, 1) ≥ g(0, 1), bf(1, 0) ≥ g(1, 0). This
means that g can be obtained from bf by diminishing bilateral transfers from
(0, 1) and/or (0, 1) to (0, 0), and we are done.
Case 2: m(f) = m(g) = (1, 0).
Note that ifm(f) = m(g) = (1, 0) and if g is more unequal than f, then g
can be obtained from f by a finite number of correlation-increasing switches
(from (1, 0) and (0, 1) to (1, 1) and (0, 0)) and bilateral transfers from (1, 0) to
the extreme outcomes (1, 1) and (0, 0). Regardless of how these correlation-
increasing switches and bilateral transfers are ordered, each intermediate
pseudo-distribution is a distribution. Thus, a single correlation-increasing
switch is enough (since all correlation-increasing switches can be amalga-
mated into a single correlation-increasing switch and still each intermediate
pseudo-distribution is a distribution). In particular, we can obtain g from f
in three steps, ordered as follows: (1) a correlation-increasing transfer, (2) a
bilateral transfer from (1, 0) to (0, 0), and (3) a bilateral transfer from (1, 0)
to (1, 1).
From these observations, we can show that g is more unequal that f
if and only if the following 5 inequalities hold: g(1, 0) ≤ f(1, 0), g(0, 1) ≤
f(0, 1), g(1, 1) ≥ f(1, 1), g(0, 0) ≥ f(0, 0), f(0, 1) − g(0, 1) ≤ min{g(1, 1) −
f(1, 1), g(0, 0)− f(0, 0)} and f(1, 0)− g(1, 0) ≥ f(0, 1)− g(0, 1).
Necessity of the first four inequalities is straightforward. The fifth in-
equality f(1, 0)−g(1, 0) ≥ f(0, 1)−g(0, 1) must hold since the only way that
density can be transferred away from (0, 1) is by means of a correlation-
increasing transfer and thus it must be the case that at least the same
amount is going to be transferred away from (1, 0). For suﬃciency, we give
the following constructive argument.
Suppose that the 5 inequalities hold. Let λ = f(0, 1) − g(0, 1). Define
the distribution bf by bf(0, 1) = f(0, 1) − λ, bf(1, 0) = f(1, 0) − λ, bf(0, 0) =
f(0, 0)+λ, and bf(1, 1) = f(1, 1)+λ. Then bf(0, 1) = g(0, 1), bf(0, 0) ≥ g(0, 0)
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and bf(0, 0) ≥ g(0, 0). Thus, g can be obtained from bf by bilateral transfers
from (1, 0) to (0, 0) and (1, 1) and we are done.
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B Appendix: Deprivation indicators
Welfare indica-
tor
Description Number
of obser-
vations
Severe nutrition
deprivation
Children under five years of age whose heights and
weights for their age are more than -3 standard
deviations below the median of the international
reference population, i.e. severe anthropometric
failure
8,001
Severe water de-
privation
Children under 18 years of age who only have ac-
cess to surface water (e.g. rivers) for drinking or
who live in households where the nearest source of
water is more than 15 minutes away
33,058
Severe sanita-
tion deprivation
Children under 18 years of age who have no ac-
cess to a toilet of any kind in the vicinity of their
dwelling, including communal toilets or latrines
33,058
Severe health
deprivation
Children under five years of age that have never
been immunised against any diseases or young
children who have had a resent illness involving
diarrhoea and did not receive any medical advise
or treatment
8,822
Severe shelter
deprivation
Children under 18 years of age living in dwellings
with more than five people per room (severe over-
crowding) or with no flooring material (e.g. mud
floor)
33,058
Severe education
deprivation
Children aged between 7 and 18 who have never
been to school and are not currently attending
school
18,232
Severe informa-
tion deprivation
Children aged between 5 and 18 with no possession
of and access to radio, television or telephone at
home
26,619
Source: UNICEF (2006), Annex I.
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